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abstract
This critical study of Sanford Goldberg’s Relying on Others focuses on the book’s
central claim, the extendedness hypothesis, according to which the processes rel-
evant for assessing the reliability of a hearer’s testimonial belief include the cogni-
tive processes involved in the production of the testimony.
1. introduction
In Relying on Others, Sanford Goldberg considers interpersonal epistemic reliance – and
testimony in particular – in relation to the general framework of process reliabilism (as
introduced in Goldman 1979, 1986). Process reliabilism has been applied to social epis-
temology in various contexts. But Goldberg provides an original angle by connecting
the social epistemology of testimony to a particular long-standing problem for reliabilists:
the problem of how to individuate cognitive processes for epistemic purposes. The general
connection of these issues and Goldberg’s specic take on it deserve attention.
Towards the end of the introduction, Goldberg states the three main aims of the book:
(i) to assuage any remaining concerns people might be having regarding the legitimacy of the pro-
ject of social epistemology; (ii) to develop a reliabilist program for how at least some such research
might proceed; (iii) to make clear that some epistemic relevance of the social goes beyond the
status of knowledge itself. (91)
While Relying on Others largely succeeds in contributing to at least some readings of (i)
and (iii), I will argue that it is less successful with regard to (ii). Moreover, since (ii) may
reasonably be regarded as the most central and controversial of Goldberg’s three aims,
I will focus on it.
Goldberg characterizes the view that he seeks to replace, Orthodox Reliabilism, as the
conjunction of Process Reliabilism and what he labels the doctrine of Process
Individualism (PI):
PI For every subject S, all of the cognitive processes implicated in the formation
or sustainment of S’s beliefs are cognitive processes that take place within S’s
own mind/brain. (44)
1 Citations are of Goldberg, Relying on Others (2010), unless noted otherwise.
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Goldberg does not provide a full account of process-individuation. For example, he sets
aside the generality problem (82). Rather, he argues for an alternative to Orthodox
Reliabilism that consists in replacing PI with the extendedness hypothesis:
The testimony itself, along with the cognitive processes implicated in the production of that testi-
mony, are more appropriately regarded as part of the testimonial belief-forming process itself. (79)
In chapters 1–4, Goldberg argues for the extendedness hypothesis, and in chapter 5 he
defends it against various objections. In chapter 6, the focus shifts to an interesting
phenomenon that Goldberg labels ‘coverage reliability of one’s community’ in which
‘reecting on whether p, one comes to believe that p on the grounds that if p were
true one would have heard about it by now’ (154). In chapter 7, Goldberg concludes by
considering the extendedness hypothesis as a reliabilist framework for social epistemology.
Space does not allow for even a supercial discussion of all the arguments, cases, dis-
tinctions and theses that ll the pages of Relying on Others. So, I will be very selective and
discuss only some of Goldberg’s main aims, assumptions and arguments.2
The book’s central dispute can be illustrated with a twin case that contrasts ‘good’
and ‘bad’ cases (14–15). In the good case, a hearer H generates a true testimonial belief
that p on the basis of the testimony of a competent and sincere speaker, S. In the bad
case, a twin-hearer, H*, generates a true testimonial belief that p by accepting the testimony
of a speaker, S*, who seeks to mislead H* but accidentally expresses a true proposition.
Goldberg concludes, plausibly, that H acquires testimonial knowledge and that H*
does not. The central dispute, however, concerns Goldberg’s diagnosis, according to
which H* fails to know because H* is not justied.3 According to Goldberg, this is
because the epistemically relevant process extends to include S*’s cognitive processes
involved in generating the testimony. However, Goldberg recognizes that Orthodox
Reliabilists may argue that H*’s belief is as justied as H’s belief but that the case is a
Gettier-style case in which H*’s process is locally unreliable (Goldman 1986).
Consequently, much of Relying on Others is devoted to arguing that the extendedness
account is superior to the Orthodox Reliabilist account. Below I argue that some of
Goldberg’s central arguments are unlikely to convert Orthodox Reliabilists.
2. an alleged analogy between testimony and memory
In the above-mentioned ‘bad case’, H* fails to know. This much is common ground
between Goldberg and his opponents. But Goldberg’s diagnosis, that this is because
H*’s extended belief-generating process is unreliable, is controversial. This diagnosis, in
turn, requires that the processes involved in generating testimonial belief are epistemically
similar to those involved in memory and inference.
2 For example, I waive some concerns with Goldberg’s characterization of Orthodox Reliabilism in terms
of PI. There may be discrepancies between Orthodox Reliabilism, thus characterized, and the views of
actual reliabilists. However, I sidestep such exegetical matters in order to work with Goldberg’s
characterization.
3 Throughout I adopt Goldberg’s use of ‘justied’ to denote a general positive epistemic property. So, I
stray from my usual practice of reserving ‘justied’ for an internalist species of warrant (where ‘warrant’
denotes a genus harboring both internalist and externalist species: Gerken forthcoming).
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Goldberg sensibly considers this putative analogy in terms of Goldman’s distinction
between belief-dependent and belief-independent processes (Goldman 1979, 1986). A cen-
tral common denominator for memory and inference is that they are belief-dependent pro-
cesses. In each case, the relevant input is a belief. This is epistemically important.
Simplied a bit, Goldberg argues that unless the belief that serves as input for memory
is itself generated by a reliable process, the memory-generated belief will not amount to
knowledge – even if the memory process is impeccably reliable. So, in the case of memory
(and inference), the epistemically relevant process extends to include the processes that
provide the input.4 So, Goldberg’s similar account for testimony requires an analogy
between testimony and memory in this regard.
However, Goldberg correctly notes that the inputs of testimonial processes are not
beliefs (68–71). But the conclusion he draws from this insight is not that testimony is
not belief-dependent. Rather, Goldberg concludes that what is needed is ‘a more liberal
understanding of the notion of a belief-dependent process – one that allows, for example,
another’s testimony to serve as an input’ (71–2).
At this point, an Orthodox Reliabilist may reasonably worry that Goldberg is, in effect,
tailoring the notion of belief-dependence, eventually labeled quasi-belief-dependence,
to his purposes. Moreover, I found Goldberg’s liberalization of belief-dependence to
quasi-belief-dependence to reinforce this worry. Goldberg claims that
the core idea behind a belief-dependent process is that of a process the reliability of whose outputs
depends on the reliability of its inputs. This, after all, is the idea behind the GIGO (‘Garbage In,
Garbage Out’) principle that motivates the reliabilist’s talk of belief-dependence. (72)
It may not be accurate that GIGO is the idea that motivates Orthodox Reliabilists’ talk of
belief-dependence. The fact that belief-dependent processes are attributable to the individ-
ual is, at least for some Orthodox Reliabilists, another motivation. But Goldberg takes the
GIGO-consideration to motivate three individually necessary and jointly sufcient con-
ditions on quasi-belief-dependence:
First, such a process must be a cognitive process the reliability of whose outputs are a function of
the reliability of its inputs. This, in turn, requires that the process should have inputs, and that
these inputs be assessable in terms of their reliability. And, in order to be strict about what it is
for an input to be assessable in terms of its reliability, we will insist that an input satises this con-
dition only if it (the input) is itself the output of a cognitive process (process-type) whose reliability
can be assessed in its turn. (72)
Goldberg claims that the three conditions are sufcient for quasi-belief-dependence by
noting that ‘the conditions are demanding enough to ensure that any process that satises
them has some reliability-assessable input’ (73). Goldberg then argues that testimony
satises the three conditions. This last step is plausible. But the worry persists that this
is largely because Goldberg’s three conditions jointly set forth an excessively inclusive
sufcient condition on quasi-belief-dependence.
4 Likewise, Goldberg argues that the epistemically relevant process generating an inferential belief – the
conclusion belief – extends to include the processes involved in generating the input: premise-beliefs. I
set aside the issue of inference (but see Goldberg 2007; Gerken 2011a).
crit ical study of goldberg ’s relying on others
episteme volume 9–1 83
To see this, note that if perceptual beliefs are generated on the basis of perceptual represen-
tations that are the reliability-assessable outputs of cognitive processes, certain perceptual
processes qualify as quasi-belief-dependent.5 This result would seem to be in tension with
Goldberg’s attempt to repudiate ‘the perceptual model of testimonial belief’ (77 et passim).
Furthermore, this putative overgeneralizationworry augments the concern that the notion of
quasi-belief-dependence is overly inclusive. So, I think that Orthodox Reliabilists may
reasonably eschew the notion of quasi-belief-dependence as ad hoc and too liberal.
Note that Orthodox Reliabilists may avoid Goldberg’s liberalization and uphold the
view that belief-dependent processes such as memory and inference extend, for the pur-
poses of reliability assessment, to the individual’s cognitive processes that produce their
input-belief. As mentioned, a partial rationale for this view is that the processes that
produce the input-belief are attributable to the agent. Goldberg’s liberalization of belief-
dependence to quasi-belief-dependence does not respect this difference. It strains the
analogy between testimony and memory in this regard. So, given their antecedent commit-
ments, Orthodox Reliabilists have little reason to adopt the analogy.
Of course, a central project ofRelying on Others is to challenge those antecedent commit-
ments concerning the epistemic signicance of attributing a process to the individual. But the
analogy between memory and testimony was supposed to contribute to this project. To do so
it requires some independent motivation and this is what I have questioned.
This is not to suggest that Goldberg fails to recognize that memory is intrapersonal
whereas testimony is interpersonal (see e.g. 76). But he does not convincingly address a
central related asymmetry. If someone forms a belief unreliably and later (re)generates it
by memory,6 an unreliable cognitive process is ascribable to her. In contrast, no unreliable
cognitive process may be ascribed to the hearer in the ‘bad case’ in which her testimonial
belief is generated on the basis of a testimony that is indiscernibly unreliable (or
not-quite-good-enough for knowledge).
3. not quite good enough
The parenthetical remark in the preceding sentence is inserted to address Goldberg’s best
candidate case contra Orthodox Reliabilism. The case concerns a testimonial belief that is
not knowledge, although it is, according to Orthodox Reliabilism, unGETTIERED7 and
reliable (98). In this case, the testier is sincere and his true belief is ‘formed through a
process that, though formed in a way that was not epistemically irresponsible, was not
quite reliable enough to count as knowledge (and not for having been GETTIERED)’ (97).
Goldberg labels this property ‘not quite good enough’8 and gives an example:
a case in which the testimony expresses a would-be recognition-based belief formed through a
momentary glance at what appeared to the subject to be a familiar object, but where the object
5 For the distinction between perceptual representation and perceptual belief, see Burge (2010).
6 I adopt this overly simplistic model of memory for presentational purposes only.
7 Goldberg uses ‘GETTIERED’ (in small caps) to apply to justied true beliefs that, in Goldman’s phrase,
‘founder on some other requirement for knowledge of the kind discussed in the post-Gettier knowledge-
trade’ (86, citing Goldman 1979).
8 For convenience, I’ll hyphenate this phrase.
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in question was slightly obscured to the subject, at a bit of a distance from her, under non-ideal
lighting conditions. (98)
Let’s call the recipient of this not-quite-good-enough testimony ‘H**’ and the speaker
‘S**.’ Goldberg claims that postulating a Gettier-style condition to motivate the verdict
that H** lacks knowledge ‘is both unnecessary and without independent support’ (103).
Goldberg moreover stipulates that the testiers in H**’s social environment are gener-
ally reliable and that S** also generally ‘testies in highly reliable fashion’ (103). So it is
only with regards to p that S** gives not-quite-good-enough testimony. Given these
stipulations, Goldberg claims that it is implausible to regard H**’s testimonial belief as
GETTIERED due to local unreliability (104).
Although this is Goldberg’s best candidate case against Orthodox Reliabilism, several
responses are available. Recall that Orthodox Reliabilists argue that indiscernibly unreliable
testimony may undermine knowledge without affecting justication. So, it is unclear why
Orthodox Reliabilists cannot uphold a uniform diagnosis of indiscernibly not-quite-good-
enough testimony. This general response does not appear to hinge on a particular classi-
cation of the not-quite-good-enough aspect of the testier’s belief-generating process.
However, more specic Orthodox Reliabilist responses may involve distinctions within
the notion of local reliability, which is – as Goldberg notes (12 n. 2) – a difcult notion
that has been debated since its introduction (McGinn 1984; Goldman 1986). Consider,
for illustration, a tripartite taxonomy between global, local, and what I will here call
belief-specic reliability – where the latter concerns the token-process involved in the gen-
eration of the relevant belief-token.9 The taxonomy may be illustrated by the Fake Barn
Scenario (Goldman 1976). Here the subject’s process is globally reliable, not locally
reliable but, as a matter of luck, belief-specically reliable. The local unreliability explains
why the subject lacks knowledge, the global reliability explains why the subject’s belief is
justied and the belief-specic reliability explains why it is true. However, Orthodox
Reliabilism can allow that belief-specic unreliability can undermine knowledge. To see
this, consider Chisholm’s case of seeing a rock visually indiscernible from a sheep on a
eld where a sheep happens to be hiding (Chisholm 1977). Here it is the belief-specic,
rather than the local or global, unreliability of the subject’s belief-generating process
that explains why she is not a knower.
Given these distinctions, the twist in Goldberg’s tale is that the testier’s process
is globally and locally reliable but that the testier’s belief-specic reliability is not-
quite-good-enough for knowledge. So, Goldberg’s opponent may cite the not-quite-
good-enough belief-specic reliability as the relevant factor. This approach is an extension
of the Orthodox Reliabilist view that global reliability determines the justicatory status of
the relevant belief although local and belief-specic unreliability can undermine knowl-
edge without affecting justication.
The central additional assumption is that, just as belief-specic unreliability can under-
mine knowledge, so can not-quite-good-enough belief-specic reliability. This assumption
is partly motivated by the idea that H** generates the testimonial belief by a process,
attributable to H**, in a way that can be characterized as follows. The process is reliable
9 I use the phrase ‘belief-specic reliability’ for expositional purposes, bracketing the worry that reliability
is a property of process-types rather than of a single application associated with a token-belief. So, the
idea is set forth in an exploratory spirit.
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relative to general features of H**’s social environment, but it is, on the particular appli-
cation, too lucky (relative to the degree of belief-specic reliability) that the belief is true.
Further work is required to determine whether the putative distinction between local and
belief-specic reliability is tenable. I re-emphasize that I have primarily hinted at such a puta-
tive distinction to explore a specic response strategy. But, as mentioned, an Orthodox
Reliabilist account does not require this particular distinction. Independently of how the
not-quite-good-enough testimonial belief is classied, the core of the response remains: just
as an indiscernible but unreliable testier can defeat knowledge (without affecting justica-
tion), so can an indiscernible but not-quite-reliable-enough testier. This approach offers
theOrthodoxReliabilist a far more uniform account of twin cases thanGoldberg’s approach.
Hence Orthodox Reliabilists can account for Goldberg’s key case by extending their favored
account rather than by adopting the extendedness hypothesis. So it appears that Goldberg’s
best candidate case for the extendedness hypothesis is not quite good enough.
4. a doppelgänger objection
In section 5, Goldberg responds to a number of objections. Since he relies heavily on twin
cases throughout Relying on Others, I select for discussion his response to Schmitt’s
doppelgänger objection:10
[A] doctor performs a thorough test to determine whether you have strep throat and tells you that
it’s certain that you do; you then believe that you have strep throat on the basis of the doctor’s
testimony. Now modify the case in such a way that it merely appears to you that the test is
thorough; in reality the doctor is irresponsibly guessing and saying that the result is certain.
Alternatively, modify the case even further, so that he is faking its performance. We might even
imagine a case in which the doctor appears to be performing the test, but in fact you are just hal-
lucinating the whole thing: there is no test, or even a doctor. On [the ‘extendedness’ hypothesis],
your belief in either of these modied cases fails to be justied. But intuitively your belief is (at least
in the rst modied case and perhaps in the second as well) as justied as in the paradigmatic case.
(148, citing Schmitt 1999: 370)
As Goldberg remarks, the cases sketched by Schmitt are importantly distinct. So, I will
focus on the juxtaposition between the ‘good case’ in which all goes well and the rst
modication of it, which Goldberg labels the ‘not-so-good case’. Schmitt and Goldberg
leave the general social environmental conditions unspecied.11 But I will work on the
interpretation that testimonies from doctors about medical matters are generally very
reliable in the relevant environment.
Schmitt’s verdict that the hearer in the good case and his doppelgänger in the
not-so-good case are equally justied may be supported in various ways. Goldberg begins
his criticism of Schmitt’s verdict by expressing puzzlement that Schmitt has ‘different reac-
tions to these cases’ since ‘the only thing backing the “equally justied” verdict (so far as I
can tell) is the fact that all of these scenarios are indistinguishable-to-you’ (149).
10 I am not drawing a distinction between twin cases and doppelgänger cases. I simply follow Goldberg’s
terminology.
11 In Gerken (forthcoming) I provide a similar case, MALARIA, which is explicit on this point.
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I disagree with Goldberg’s complaint about Schmitt’s asymmetric treatment of the
cases.12 But I will focus on Goldberg’s remark that the indiscernible-to-you consideration
is the only thing backing the ‘equally justied’ verdict. In particular, I will argue that this
claim underestimates more promising Orthodox Reliabilist rationales. I cannot, due to
space limitations, assess all of Goldberg’s discussion. But by juxtaposing two central aspects
of it, I will try to indicate why I think it will be unlikely to sway Orthodox Reliabilists.
Goldberg provides a ‘programmatic reason for the justication-reliabilist to reject the
“equally justied” verdict that generates Schmitt’s objection’ (151). Roughly, the pro-
grammatic worry is that the ‘equally justied’ verdict cannot ‘honor the link between
truth and justication’ (151). The programmatic worry is connected to more specic wor-
ries, and one of them concerns a strand of motivation for the ‘equally justied’ verdict:
‘One thing that might be used to support this verdict is the claim that two hearers who
are equally epistemically responsible in their consumption of testimony are equally well
justied’ (152).
To be sure, it would be an inadequate reliabilist response to solely appeal to sameness
of epistemic responsibility. But epistemic responsibility is far from the sole factor that
Orthodox Reliabilists would appeal to. While Goldberg recognizes this, I was puzzled
that he did not, at this point, do more to address the distinctively social externalist aspect
of his opponent’s account. For example, the Orthodox Reliabilist will claim that the pro-
cesses involved in accepting a doctor’s testimony about a medical matter are globally
reliable. The fact that the particular doctor in the not-so-good case is unreliable does
not change the global reliability of the relevant processes.
So, Schmitt’s verdict is consistent with a social externalist version of Orthodox
Reliabilism that does honor the link between truth and justication. After all, the pro-
cesses are evaluated with regard to truth-conduciveness. They are globally reliable relative
to the general social environment that both hearers are embedded in. The account is social
externalist in two senses. First, the hearer’s process involved in accepting the doctor’s tes-
timony is globally reliable relative to general external social facts. Second, the hearer need
not have cognitive access to these facts or the global reliability of the process. I have only
sketched this motivation in a broad, generic manner.13 But it should be clear that it goes
beyond responsibility considerations and the associated ‘indistinguishable-to-you’ con-
sideration. Consequently, Goldberg’s defense of the extendedness hypothesis against the
doppelgänger objection is unlikely to convert Orthodox Reliabilists.
5. conclusion
I have assessed some of Goldberg’s central arguments for the extendedness hypothesis and
found them wanting. But, of course, this assessment does not amount to a defense of
12 Schmitt might respond by rejecting that the epistemically relevant aspect of the hallucination case is, as
Goldberg has it, ‘something in the world, not within you’ (150). In contrast to the not-so-good case,
Schmitt’s hallucination case involves a malfunction of the individual’s cognitive processes (see Gerken
2011a, 2011b, for a distinction between well-functioning and malfunctioning fallibility). So, Schmitt
may argue that the hallucinating and non-hallucinating subjects differ in their belief-generating pro-
cesses although those differences are phenomenally indiscernible. The response does not appeal to
the ‘indistinguishable-to-you’ consideration, and it is compatible with Orthodox Reliabilism.
13 For example, the sketched response does not hinge on particularities of Gerken (forthcoming).
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Orthodox Reliabilism or a positive account of process-individuation. Moreover, the dis-
cussion of Goldberg’s case for the extendedness hypothesis is far from comprehensive.
So, the sketched reservations are correspondingly inconclusive. The issue of
process-individuation is notoriously hard, and Goldberg deserves credit for connecting
it to central issues in social epistemology. This focus provides a fruitful context within
which reliabilists may reconsider process-individuation.
I regret having to set aside other aspects of Relying on Others, such as the interesting
phenomenon of epistemic coverage in chapter 6, in order to focus on Goldberg’s main aim
of providing a novel reliabilist framework. Despite my reservations about Goldberg’s
arguments for this framework, Relying on Others is interesting due to its creative exposure
of important phenomena in social epistemology.
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